Signed and encrypted firmware updates, for the product's whole life
Keep your update tool. Move the key into an HSM.
A signature decides what a device will install. LAAVAT signs your RAUC, Mender and SWUpdate bundles with keys held in an HSM, and can encrypt them for a product or for each device.

What “signed update” has to mean
Who holds the signing key?
Signed is not secret
Old images are still signed
An update channel is only as trustworthy as the key behind it. If that key sits on a build machine, so does control of your fleet.
A signature decides whether a device accepts an update, not who can read it. Encryption is what protects the firmware itself.
A vulnerable release from last year carries a valid signature too. Anti-rollback and a second check at boot close that door.
What changes when signing moves into LAAVAT
Keys stay in the HSM
Signing keys are generated in FIPS-validated HSMs and never leave them in the clear. Your build servers never hold a key.
Every signature on record
Who signed what, when, and who approved it, in an exportable audit trail that is ready for your technical file.
Approval before signing
Production releases wait for an approver, or a quorum, before anything is signed. Access follows the groups in your identity provider.
What the CRA expects of updates
Annex I asks that vulnerabilities can be fixed through security updates, distributed securely. A signed update path is how a device knows a fix is genuine.
Build, sign, encrypt, ship
Build as you do today
Create the RAUC bundle, Mender artifact or SWUpdate image in your pipeline. For digest-based flows only a hash leaves your build.
Approve and sign
An approver signs off and the signature comes back. Devices install only bundles signed with your key, and every signature is in the audit log.
Encrypt if you need to
AES-GCM-256 with a shared product key, or a key per device, which limits what one leaked key exposes.
Pick your update tool
01
Signed Mender OTA updates
The Mender artifact manifest is signed in LAAVAT, and devices accept only artifacts signed with your key.
04
RAUC signing with one-time keys
A worked example that signs a RAUC bundle with a one-time certificate for each bundle.
02
Encrypted RAUC with per-device keys
Bundles are signed and encrypted to the devices in each rollout wave. Device keys stay inside OP-TEE.
05
AES-GCM-256 image encryption
Encrypt firmware images with keys managed in LAAVAT and delivered to manufacturing.
03
Signed SWUpdate updates
Only the sw-description digest goes to LAAVAT, with raw RSA, RSA-PSS or CMS signatures.
06
Container signing with cosign
OCI images are signed through LAAVAT and verified with cosign or a Skopeo policy on pull.
