Secure boot signing for the chips you actually ship
From the boot ROM to your application, every stage verified
LAAVAT keeps the signing keys in an HSM and signs every boot stage in the format your silicon expects. Only firmware you signed will run.

Where secure boot projects go wrong
Keys on a build server
Fuses are forever
A different tool for every chip
A signing key in a CI variable or on a laptop is one leak away from someone else's firmware booting on your devices.
The key hash you burn at the factory is permanent. The keys behind it have to stay safe, and usable, for the whole life of the product.
HAB, AHAB, Bootgen, MCUboot and OEMiRoT each bring their own key formats and signing tools to wire into the build.
Set up once at the factory. Sign every release.
Create the product
Define the device family and its signing operations. The keys are generated inside the HSM and never leave it.
Anchor the public keys
Fetch the public keys or their hash and provision them once at the factory: an SRK hash in fuses, OBKeys, or a PPK hash in eFUSEs.
Sign every release
Your pipeline requests a signature, an approver signs off, and the signed image comes back. Each boot stage checks the next, and every signature is in the audit log.
What changes when signing moves into LAAVAT
Keys stay in the HSM
Signing keys are generated in FIPS-validated HSMs and never leave them in the clear. Your build servers never hold a key.
Every signature on record
Who signed what, when, and who approved it, in an exportable audit trail that is ready for your technical file.
Approval before signing
Production releases wait for an approver, or a quorum, before anything is signed. Access follows the groups in your identity provider.
Why it matters for the CRA
The CRA expects vulnerabilities to be fixable through security updates. That only works if a device can tell genuine firmware from anything else.
Pick your hardware
01
Nordic nRF with MCUboot
MCUboot and the Zephyr application signed with ECDSA P-256 keys held in the HSM.
04
NXP i.MX 9 AHAB with SPSDK
AHAB containers signed with four SRK keys created in the HSM. Only the SRK hash leaves the platform.
02
STM32H5 with OEMiRoT
Secure and non-secure images signed in MCUboot format, with the public keys in OBKeys.
05
AMD/Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ with Bootgen
The boot image is authenticated against a PPK hash in eFUSEs, with PSK and SSK keys kept in the HSM.
03
NXP i.MX8M: HAB, FIT, OP-TEE and RAUC
One product covers the HAB boot image, the kernel FIT, OP-TEE trusted apps and RAUC bundles.
06
ESP32 and custom bootloaders
Digest signing sends only a hash to LAAVAT, so it fits ESP32 Secure Boot v2 and custom formats.
