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Secure boot signing for the chips you actually ship

From the boot ROM to your application, every stage verified​

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LAAVAT keeps the signing keys in an HSM and signs every boot stage in the format your silicon expects. Only firmware you signed will run.

LAAVAT product list with signing operations for each device family

Where secure boot projects go wrong

Keys on a build server

Fuses are forever

A different tool for every chip

A signing key in a CI variable or on a laptop is one leak away from someone else's firmware booting on your devices.

The key hash you burn at the factory is permanent. The keys behind it have to stay safe, and usable, for the whole life of the product.

HAB, AHAB, Bootgen, MCUboot and OEMiRoT each bring their own key formats and signing tools to wire into the build.

Set up once at the factory. Sign every release.

Create the product

Define the device family and its signing operations. The keys are generated inside the HSM and never leave it.

Anchor the public keys

Fetch the public keys or their hash and provision them once at the factory: an SRK hash in fuses, OBKeys, or a PPK hash in eFUSEs.

Sign every release

Your pipeline requests a signature, an approver signs off, and the signed image comes back. Each boot stage checks the next, and every signature is in the audit log.

What changes when signing moves into LAAVAT

Keys stay in the HSM

Signing keys are generated in FIPS-validated HSMs and never leave them in the clear. Your build servers never hold a key.

Every signature on record

Who signed what, when, and who approved it, in an exportable audit trail that is ready for your technical file.

Approval before signing

Production releases wait for an approver, or a quorum, before anything is signed. Access follows the groups in your identity provider.

Why it matters for the CRA

The CRA expects vulnerabilities to be fixable through security updates. That only works if a device can tell genuine firmware from anything else.

Pick your hardware

01

Nordic nRF with MCUboot

MCUboot and the Zephyr application signed with ECDSA P-256 keys held in the HSM.

04

NXP i.MX 9 AHAB with SPSDK

AHAB containers signed with four SRK keys created in the HSM. Only the SRK hash leaves the platform.

02

STM32H5 with OEMiRoT

Secure and non-secure images signed in MCUboot format, with the public keys in OBKeys.

05

AMD/Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ with Bootgen

The boot image is authenticated against a PPK hash in eFUSEs, with PSK and SSK keys kept in the HSM.

03

NXP i.MX8M: HAB, FIT, OP-TEE and RAUC

One product covers the HAB boot image, the kernel FIT, OP-TEE trusted apps and RAUC bundles.

06

ESP32 and custom bootloaders

Digest signing sends only a hash to LAAVAT, so it fits ESP32 Secure Boot v2 and custom formats.

See how Vaisala, a global leader in weather, environmental and industrial measurement, uses LAAVAT to secure its connected products.

See it in practice

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Pick your hardware or update tool and watch a team go from first login to a signed release, in about 90 seconds.

See it on your own hardware

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