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The LAAVAT blog: CRA, secure boot and device identity


Signed is not safe: what firmware signing and key management actually protect
Secure boot only proves who signed an image, not that it is safe. Four recent CVEs in FatFs, U-Boot, RAUC and UEFI (PKfail) show the three ways signed firmware fails, and the one that signing and key management actually prevent.

Lauri Hokkanen
Nov 35 min read


Secure boot is not one feature, it’s a chain
Secure boot on a Linux gateway is a chain of five or six verified links, each with its own key and its own trust anchor. Count the links, count the keys, and ask of each: where is it, who may use it, is there a record.

Lauri Hokkanen
Sep 175 min read


Secure boot, secure updates and device identity: the three practices the CRA quietly expects
The EU Cyber Resilience Act expects three engineering practices from connected devices: secure boot, verifiable firmware updates and a cryptographic device identity. Why they are one key-management problem, and three questions to test your own product.

Lauri Hokkanen
Sep 113 min read
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