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The LAAVAT blog: CRA, secure boot and device identity


Signed is not safe: what firmware signing and key management actually protect
Secure boot only proves who signed an image, not that it is safe. Four recent CVEs in FatFs, U-Boot, RAUC and UEFI (PKfail) show the three ways signed firmware fails, and the one that signing and key management actually prevent.

Lauri Hokkanen
Nov 35 min read


When signing your update isn't enough: encrypting firmware updates
A signature decides whether a device accepts an update, not who can read it. Two ways to encrypt firmware updates, a shared product key or a key per device, where the plaintext and the keys exist, what one leaked key exposes, and what the CRA asks for.

Lauri Hokkanen
Oct 57 min read


Secure boot, secure updates and device identity: the three practices the CRA quietly expects
The EU Cyber Resilience Act expects three engineering practices from connected devices: secure boot, verifiable firmware updates and a cryptographic device identity. Why they are one key-management problem, and three questions to test your own product.

Lauri Hokkanen
Sep 113 min read
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